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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

8 JON CROSSLAND,

9 Plaintiff,

10 v.

11 WIDEORBIT, INC.,

12 Defendant.  
13

CASE NO. C18-1422RSL

ORDER GRANTING MOTION  
TO DISMISS RETALIATION  
CLAIM

14 This matter comes before the Court on “Defendant’s Motion for Partial  
15 Dismissal.” Dkt. # 10. Plaintiff alleges that defendant terminated his employment  
16 because of his age and/or because he complained about age-based harassment.  
17 Defendant seeks dismissal of the retaliation claim, arguing that plaintiff has failed to  
18 allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that he engaged in protected activity  
19 under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) or that his termination  
20 was causally related to any such activity.

21 The question for the Court on a motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged in  
22 the complaint sufficiently state a “plausible” ground for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v.  
23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

24 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that  
25 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is  
26 liable for the misconduct alleged. Plausibility requires pleading facts, as

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1       opposed to conclusory allegations or the formulaic recitation of elements  
2       of a cause of action, and must rise above the mere conceivability or  
3       possibility of unlawful conduct that entitles the pleader to relief. Factual  
4       allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative  
5       level. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a  
6       defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and  
7       plausibility of entitlement to relief. Nor is it enough that the complaint is  
8       factually neutral; rather, it must be factually suggestive.

9       Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks  
10      and citations omitted). All well-pleaded allegations are presumed to be true, with all  
11      reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the non-moving party. In re Fitness Holdings  
12      Int'l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2013). If the complaint fails to state a  
13      cognizable legal theory or fails to provide sufficient facts to support a claim, dismissal is  
14      appropriate. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th  
15      Cir. 2010).

16       Plaintiff, a 64 year old man, alleges that he had a stellar performance record as a  
17      Senior Sales Manager for defendant for thirteen years. In February 2018, however, the  
18      Canadian territory plaintiff had been managing was summarily taken from him, and he  
19      was told that the change would adversely impact the calculation of his annual bonus.  
20      The Canadian territory was given to a younger, less experienced employee. Although  
21      plaintiff alleges that he was devastated and humiliated by the loss of the Canadian  
22      accounts, there is no indication that he complained that this decision was the result of  
23      age discrimination.

24       In March 2018, at a meeting of defendant's Product & Sales employees in San  
25      Diego, one of defendant's Vice Presidents made a formal presentation of a hard hat to  
26      plaintiff. The hard hat was emblazoned with the words "Caution Old Zone."  
27      Immediately after the presentation, plaintiff complained about the "gift" to a supervisor  
28      and an officer of defendant. He told them that the hat was not amusing and that he had

1 been embarrassed by the Vice President.

2 Three months after complaining about the hard hat incident, plaintiff was given a  
3 choice: either develop an exit plan for himself or be put on a performance plan that  
4 would monitor unspecified sales metrics. If he failed to meet the undetermined sales  
5 objectives, he would be dismissed. The implication was that plaintiff's role with  
6 defendant was coming to an end regardless of which avenue he chose. Plaintiff argued  
7 that defendant's proposal was nonsensical, pointing to his sales and pending business in  
8 2018 and asking how \$7 million in revenue could be deemed unacceptable performance.  
9 In July 2018, defendant offered a severance package which plaintiff refused. Plaintiff's  
10 employment was terminated on August 3, 2018.

11 Defendant does not seek dismissal of plaintiff's age discrimination claim, only  
12 his retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under RCW  
13 49.60.210(1), plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity,  
14 (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between  
15 his activity and the adverse action. Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 182 Wn. App. 733,  
16 742-43 (2014). In order to satisfy the first element of the prima facie case, plaintiff must  
17 allege that he opposed conduct which was, or which he reasonably believed was,  
18 forbidden by RCW Chapter 49.60. The WLAD protects a person who reasonably  
19 believes he or she is opposing discriminatory practices even if it turns out that the  
20 practice is not actually discriminatory. RCW 49.60.210(1); Currier, 182 Wn. App. at  
21 743.

22 Plaintiff alleges that he complained about the hard hat "gift" and was terminated  
23 shortly thereafter.<sup>1</sup> The question, then, is whether the complaint constituted opposition  
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25 <sup>1</sup> In his opposition, plaintiff asserts that he complained not only about the inappropriate  
26 "gift," but also about a pattern of age discrimination at the company, of which the "gift" was  
simply more evidence. Dkt. # 12 at 2. There are no allegations in the complaint that could

1 to conduct which plaintiff reasonably believed was forbidden by the WLAD. There are  
2 two types of discriminatory practices forbidden by RCW Chapter 49.60. First, an  
3 employer cannot subject an employee to an adverse employment action because of a  
4 protected characteristic. The disparate treatment analysis does not apply here. The  
5 presentation of a gag gift, even one in bad taste, had no effect on the express terms or  
6 conditions of plaintiff's employment: he was not fired, refused a promotion, demoted,  
7 transferred, reassigned, or subjected to a cut in pay or benefits as a result of the  
8 presentation. Rather, plaintiff appears to be arguing that the presentation created a  
9 hostile work environment and that his complaint about the presentation therefore  
10 constituted protected activity.

11 The Court assumes, for purposes of this motion, that the hard hat presentation  
12 was prompted by plaintiff's age and that plaintiff subjectively found the attention  
13 unwelcome and embarrassing. In order to establish a hostile work environment claim,  
14 plaintiff must also show that the conduct "was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter  
15 the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment." Ellorin  
16 v. Applied Finishing, Inc., 996 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1080-81 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citing  
17 Westendorf v. W. Coast Contractors of Nev., Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 2013)).<sup>2</sup>  
18 See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). In  
19 analyzing whether the alleged hostile conduct permeated the work environment, the  
20 Court looks "to the totality of the circumstances considering factors such as the  
21 frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening  
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23 support an inference that plaintiff did anything more than complain that the hard hat  
24 presentation was embarrassing.

25 <sup>2</sup> Although it is not binding, Washington courts look to Title VII case law as persuasive  
26 authority when construing the WLAD. See Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wn.2d 401,  
406 n.2 (1985).

1 or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes  
2 with an employee's work performance." MacDonald v. Korum Ford, 80 Wn. App. 877,  
3 885 (1996) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). "The required  
4 level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of  
5 the conduct." McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004)  
6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must show that a "reasonable  
7 person" would find the work environment to be "hostile or abusive" and that he, in fact,  
8 did so. Westendorf, 712 F.3d at 421.

9       The WLAD, like Title VII, precludes discrimination. The statutes are not general  
10 codes of civility, and "[a] violation is not established merely by evidence showing  
11 sporadic use of abusive language, [age]-related jokes, and occasional teasing." E.E.O.C.  
12 v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). In this case, plaintiff  
13 has identified a single age-related joke (or insult) as the basis of his hostile work  
14 environment claim. The conduct appears to have been isolated, it is not alleged to have  
15 had a discernable impact on plaintiff's work performance, and it was a verbal affront  
16 with no physical component. The fact that the employer's representative made the  
17 presentation in a public setting sets this case apart from many of the cases cited by  
18 defendant, but courts regularly find that this type of inappropriate, isolated occurrence is  
19 not severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an  
20 abusive working environment. See Davis v. Fred's Appliance, Inc., 171 Wn. App. 348,  
21 361-62 (2012); MacDonald, 80 Wn. App. at 886-87. While plaintiff was justifiably  
22 offended and complained, he could not reasonably have believed he was complaining  
23 about a hostile work environment. He cannot, therefore, satisfy the first element of the  
24 retaliation claim.

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2 For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss the retaliation  
3 claim (Dkt. # 10) is GRANTED. Although one of plaintiff's claims has been dismissed,  
4 this litigation continues. In this context, leave to amend will not be blindly granted. If  
5 plaintiff believes he can, consistent with his Rule 11 obligations, amend the allegations  
6 supporting his retaliation claim to remedy the pleading and legal deficiencies identified  
7 above, he may file a motion to amend and attach a proposed pleading for the Court's  
8 consideration.

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10 Dated this 11th day of January, 2019.

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13 Robert S. Lasnik  
14 United States District Judge  
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